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 RETHINKING PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL 
DOUGLAS LICHTMAN* 
Under the rule of prosecution history estoppel, patent applicants who amend their claims 
during the course of patent prosecution assume a significant risk: namely, the risk that a court 
will later construe the changes as concessions that should be read to limit patent scope. This 
risk is exacerbated by strong evidentiary presumptions under which courts are to assume, 
unless the patentee presents sufficient evidence otherwise, that every change triggers estoppel, 
and that the resulting estoppel forfeits everything except that which the revised language 
literally describes. The justification for these presumptions is that, implemented in this fashion, 
prosecution history estoppel makes patent scope more predictable. In this Article, I argue that 
the benefit comes at too high a price. Drawing on a large empirical study of patent prosecution, 
I show that, because of these evidentiary presumptions, estoppel is dangerously sensitive to 
differences between patent examiners and differences across technology categories. That is, 
estoppel treats similar applications in dissimilar ways, not because of differences on the merits, 
but instead because of the personal characteristics of the examiners involved and because of 
differences inherent to the types of technology at issue. A better rule, I argue, would minimize 
the significance of examiner and technology disparities by reversing the current evidentiary 
presumptions and thus recognizing estoppel only where there is clear evidence that the 
applicant and the examiner intended to forfeit a given scope of coverage.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Patent prosecution is an iterative process, and during that process patent 
applicants often change the language of their proposed claims. A running debate 
in patent law considers whether and how evidence of those language changes 
should be used by courts to construe the resulting patent claims. On one view, the 
meaning of a word can be distorted when taken out of context, and the best way to 
put patent language into context is to study the history of the patent document. On 
another view, evidence drawn from a patent’s prosecution history is cumbersome, 
ambiguous, sometimes misleading and often incomplete, and the goals of the 
patent system would therefore be better served were courts to ignore language 
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changes and focus instead on the final claim language standing alone. The puzzle 
bears an obvious resemblance to a perhaps more familiar question in statutory 
interpretation; namely, the question of whether and how legislative history should 
be used when construing the language of an enacted statute. 
In the patent context, the debate has primarily played out in the shadow of the 
doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents empowers courts to construe 
patent claims to cover not only that which they literally describe, but also some 
range of equivalent subject matter that technically falls outside the literal claim 
language but on policy grounds seems appropriately considered part of the patent 
holder’s exclusive domain. The doctrine is typically invoked in instances where 
unscrupulous competitors would otherwise be able to undermine the patent grant 
by exploiting loopholes in the literal claim language.1 Loopholes eligible for this 
sort of protection include loopholes caused by the unavoidable imprecision of 
language,2 loopholes caused by events and circumstances that were not reasonably 
foreseeable at the time the literal claim language was drafted,3 and loopholes  
where the accused invention is an insubstantial variant of the invention literally 
described.4 As these examples make plain, a major drawback to equivalents 
analysis is that it renders uncertain the precise boundaries of any particular patent 
claim. One mechanism used to address that worry—and the primary means 
through which the history of the patent document influences claim 
interpretation—is the rule of prosecution history estoppel.5 
 
                                                   
1 As the Supreme Court explained in Graver Tank, the “essence of the doctrine is that one 
may not practice fraud on a patent” by making “unimportant and insubstantial changes” that, 
“though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside” the scope of the 
literal claims. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co, 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950).  
2 See, e.g., id. at 607 (without equivalents, patentee would be “at the mercy of verbalism”); 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo VIII”), 535 U.S. 722, 734 
(“equivalents is premised on language's inability to capture the essence of innovation”).    
3 See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1226 (1988) (“the facts here do not involve later-developed 
computer technology which should be deemed within the scope of the claims to avoid the 
pirating of an invention”). 
4 See, e.g., Carman Industries v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (equivalents 
analysis appropriate where accused infringer seeks “to appropriate the invention with minor 
modification to avoid the literal language of the claims”).  
5 There are other doctrines in patent law explicitly designed to reduce the uncertainty 
created by the doctrine of equivalents. For discussion, see Adelman et. al, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW  798-841 (2d ed. 2003). 
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Prosecution history estoppel applies where a patent applicant narrows a patent 
claim during patent prosecution in order “to avoid prior art, or otherwise to 
address a specific concern ... that arguably would have rendered the claimed 
subject matter unpatentable.”6 In these instances, estoppel bars the applicant from 
later using the doctrine of equivalents to recapture the lost ground. As the 
Supreme Court put it in Schriber-Schroth—and note how the Court’s explanation 
sounds in classic estoppel and waiver terms—an applicant “may not, by resort to 
the doctrine of equivalents, give to an allowed claim [the] scope which it might 
have had without the [narrowing] amendments.”7 By amending the claim, the 
applicant is deemed to have “recognized and emphasized the difference between 
the two phrases and proclaimed his abandonment of all that is embraced in that 
difference.”8  
In order for estoppel to achieve its purpose of reducing the uncertainty 
inherent in equivalents analysis,9 estoppel itself must be implemented in a 
predictable fashion. Courts have therefore built into the rule heavy evidentiary 
presumptions. For example, although as a technical matter prosecution history 
estoppel only applies where a narrowing amendment was made to satisfy a 
requirement of the Patent Act—and note how broad a category that already is—
the Supreme Court held in Warner-Jenkenson that the patent holder bears the 
burden of establishing the reason for any narrowing amendment, and, where no 
explanation can be established, courts are to presume that estoppel applies.10 This 
has proven to be a difficult presumption for patent holders to overcome given that, 
historically, neither patent examiners nor patent applicants have put much effort 
                                                   
6 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-31 (1997); accord 
Festo VIII, supra note _, at 735. While all the major cases focus on claim language 
amendments, an applicant can trigger estoppel in other ways. For example, the act of deleting a 
claim of broader scope than those ultimately allowed certainly carries with it implicit 
representations that can later be held against the applicant. Indeed, mere arguments can also 
give rise to estoppel, even if unaccompanied by any language changes. 
7 Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 221 (1940). 
8 Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942). 
9 Although this is the theory on which the courts routinely focus, estoppel does arguably 
serve other purposes. See Part V. 
10 Warner-Jenkinson, supra note _, at 33. It is unclear what presumption, if any, is applied 
in answering the threshold question of whether a given amendment narrows or broadens a 
claim. That is, there are two preliminary questions to ask with respect to estoppel: the first 
considers whether the change narrowed or expanded claim scope, and the second—which 
applies only to narrowing amendments—asks whether the narrowing was done to satisfy a 
requirement of the Patent Act. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the proper presumption to 
apply in the first of these two inquiries, and the Federal Circuit apparently views that as an 
open question as well. See Festo IX, cited in note *, at _. 
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into documenting the reasons for patent claim amendments.11 Moreover, the 
presumption sticks even if it turns out that the amendment at issue was not in fact 
necessary to preserve patent validity. For instance, if the examiner incorrectly 
interprets the prior art and, because of that error, the applicant agrees to narrow a 
given claim, the applicant is still bound by the concession.12 Thus, in practice, the 
only evidence that immunizes a patentee is clear evidence that a given narrowing 
amendment was not made with the intent to preserve claim validity; evidence that 
the change was not necessary to satisfy Patent Act requirements is not enough.13 
Similarly, once estoppel is found to apply, courts must determine the scope of 
the resulting estoppel, and here again there is today in place a strong evidentiary 
presumption, albeit a presumption that is weaker than that recently proposed by 
the Federal Circuit.14 Specifically, under the Supreme Court’s Festo decision, the 
patentee bears the burden of showing that the amendment “cannot reasonably be 
viewed as surrendering [the] particular equivalent” at issue.15 The patentee can 
carry this burden by showing that the equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of 
the claim amendment,16 or that the “rationale underlying the amendment [bore] no 
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question.”17 But where the 
applicant cannot make these or similar showings—and, again, this is likely to be a 
common case given how poorly the process of patent prosecution is documented 
under current Patent Office practices18—the doctrine of equivalents is in essence 
repealed and the applicant must rely on literal claim coverage alone. 
                                                   
11 For a rich discussion of current practice, see John Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and 
Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 
UCLA L Rev 183, 188-91, 203 (2000). 
12 See Exhibit Supply, supra note _, at 137. Of course, the applicant can resist the examiner 
and ultimately appeal the dispute to higher officials at the Patent Office. See notes _. 
13 The evidence also must come from documents on file at the Patent Office, rather than 
from documents in the patentee’s private possession. See Festo IX, cited note *, at _. Any other 
rule would make it difficult for rivals to determine patent scope prior to litigation, thus 
undermining predictability. 
14 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“Festo VI”), 234 F.3d 558, 
564 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding, prior to Supreme Court reversal, that “when a claim amendment 
creates [estoppel], no range of equivalents is available for the amended claim element”). 
15 See Festo VIII, supra note _, at 740. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
18 See supra note _; cf. Festo VI, supra note _, at _575 (describing context-sensitive 
estoppel as “unworkable” and thus advocating a bright-line rule). Of course, all this might 
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In this Article, I raise two concerns over the practical implications of the 
modern estoppel rule. The first is based on an empirical finding that there are 
statistically significant differences between patent examiners in terms of their 
tendency to require that patent applicants alter claim language. That is, while some 
examiners routinely require significant language alterations, others regularly leave 
the original claim language largely intact. These differences are of substantial 
magnitude and they persist even after controlling for factors like the type of 
technology involved and the length of the original application. They are troubling 
because they cause the burdens of prosecution history estoppel to be distributed in 
an arbitrary fashion. If an applicant happens to be assigned to an examiner who 
tends to require few language alterations, estoppel is not much of a risk. If an 
applicant happens to be assigned an examiner who tends to demand a large 
number of language alterations, by contrast, the threat of estoppel looms large. 
From the perspective of the patent applicant, this difference is a random effect, 
unrelated to the merits, that forces unlucky applicants either to suffer the harms 
associated with estoppel, or to spend additional resources during patent 
prosecution resisting the examiner and documenting with care any amendments 
ultimately made. From a policy perspective, meanwhile, these examiner disparities 
mean that using prosecution history estoppel to reduce the uncertainty associated 
with equivalents analysis has a large and unanticipated cost: it makes the patent 
system more random, specifically by linking patent scope to what turns out to be a 
personal characteristic that varies considerably from one patent examiner to 
another.19 
My second concern derives from a related empirical finding: that there are also 
statistically significant differences across technology categories in terms of the 
extent to which claim language is changed during the average patent prosecution. 
Claim language describing a patentable advance in nanotechnology, for example, 
is on average altered much more significantly than is claim language describing a 
patentable advance related to automobile engines or electrical lighting. It is not 
entirely clear what drives these differences. But if it is right to assume that 
language adjustments are more common in complicated and rapidly evolving 
technologies—technologies where it is more difficult for applicants to write 
appropriate claims in the first instance, and technologies where there is more room 
for reasonable disagreement between applicant and examiner at the time of patent 
prosecution—then estoppel threatens the doctrine of equivalents in the very cases 
                                                                                                                                      
change now that estoppel is such a harsh rule, although such a change would be costly given 
the large number of applications filed with the Patent Office each year. 
19 Note that examiners rarely directly propose claim language. Instead, an examiner 
influences claim language indirectly by refusing to accept a literal claim until the claim is 
worded in what the examiner deems to be an acceptable manner. 
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where equivalents analysis is needed most: instances where conscientious 
applicants working with qualified examiners might still fail to capture in literal 
terms the proper boundaries of the invention at hand. 
These concerns can be addressed. Were the aforementioned evidentiary 
presumptions reversed, for example, prosecution history estoppel would be 
triggered less often, and, at that, only in situations where the applicant and 
examiner actually meant to foreclose a given equivalent. This would reduce the 
legal risk associated with amendments to claim language, and it would therefore 
reduce the importance of differences between examiners and across technology 
categories. Another approach would have the Patent Office take more seriously its 
role in documenting the process of patent prosecution. This might be expensive, 
but it, too, would help ensure that estoppel would be triggered only in situations 
where the applicant and examiner actually meant to foreclose a given equivalent, 
again rendering estoppel less sensitive to examiner and technology disparities. At 
the same time, new mechanisms could be introduced to take the place of estoppel 
in terms of reducing the uncertainty created by the doctrine of equivalents. 
Naturally, there is much more to say on all these points. I proceed as follows. 
In Part II, I introduce the basic methodology behind my empirical work, 
explaining the data set and identifying strengths and weaknesses in my approach. 
In Part III, I present my core statistical analysis. I show that the identity of the 
examiner drives the extent of claim language alteration, and I show that claim 
language alterations also differ significantly from technology to technology. In 
Part IV, I discuss the implications of these technology and examiner disparities, 
developing in further detail the challenges they raise for the rule of prosecution 
history estoppel and, through that rule, for the doctrine of equivalents as well. In 
Part V, I briefly conclude. 
II.  METHODOLOGY 
In November 2000, the United States Patent and Trademark Office initiated a 
program under which newly filed patent applications are made public “after the 
expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for which a benefit 
is sought.”20 Not all applications are published under this new program. For 
instance, an application is not published if it is abandoned during that eighteen 
month period,21 and an application is not published if the applicant asserts a 
                                                   
20 35 U.S.C. §122(b). The program operates under the authority of the American Inventors 
Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-552 (1999). The core provisions 
are codified at 35 U.S.C. §122(b).  
21 Id. §122(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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special exemption that maintains confidentiality for patent applications that have 
been filed in the United States but have not been filed in a foreign country that 
itself requires disclosure after eighteen months.22 Nevertheless, in under three 
years of operation, the program has already generated a public archive of more 
than 400,000 patent applications, and new applications are today being added at 
the rate of approximately 20,000 per month. 
In January 2003, I collected the 300,000 applications then available, and I 
traced each through its time at the Patent Office. The idea was to identify 
applications for which I could take a single issued patent, compare that patent to 
the single application in hand, and in that way detect any changes that were made 
during the process of patent review. This approach saves the expense and labor 
associated with gathering such information directly from the records kept at the 
Patent Office, making practicable an empirical study that otherwise would have 
been cost-prohibitive.23 To identify the appropriate applications, I obviously 
needed to exclude applications that were still under review, because for those there 
was no issued patent against which to compare the application; and I also needed 
to exclude applications that either had splintered into multiple related patents, or 
had the potential to so splinter, because in those instances the proper interpretation 
                                                   
22 Id. §122(b)(2)(B)(i). The applicant must also certify that the invention will not be 
subject to such an application in the future. 
23 The paperwork generated during patent prosecution—the “file wrapper”—is in theory 
available to the public after a patent issues, but acquiring this paperwork from the Patent 
Office is expensive, and files have traditionally been available only in paper form. See 37 
C.F.R. §1.19 (fee schedule). 
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of any application/patent pair would have been ambiguous.24 This filtering process 
left me with just under 20,000 workable applications.25 
Building the data set in this manner of course introduced some biases. For 
example, the data set does not include any patent applications for which patent 
prosecution took fewer than eighteen months, because patent applications are 
published under the new regulations only after eighteen months have passed. The 
data set likewise excludes patent applications that were abandoned by the 
applicant, and applications that were denied by the examiner, because the 
comparison strategy only works for applications that actually led to issued patents. 
The data set also excludes any application that qualified for the special exemption 
mentioned above, and any application that was splintered either voluntarily or at 
the direction of a patent examiner. However, none of these exclusions is 
particularly troubling for current purposes, because each primarily biases the data 
against what turned out to be my primary findings. That is, each of these 
exclusions reduces diversity in the data set, making it all the more surprising that I 
found statistically significant differences between examiners and across 
technology categories. 
                                                   
24 A patent application can split into multiple related applications either by the filing of a 
divisional application, which literally takes material first included in the original application 
and divides it into two or more separate applications, or by the filing of a continuation-in-part, 
which draws material from the original application but in addition introduces new material. 
Both variants complicate the otherwise-intuitive comparison approach, and ultimately I 
decided that it was better to exclude such applications rather than introduce error by attempting 
to incorporate them. 
Note that I also excluded continuation applications. A continuation application is an 
application submitted some time after patent prosecution has begun. It revises its associated 
original application and is separately identified primarily as a way of collecting higher fees 
from applicants who make large numbers of changes. I excluded continuations because the 
baseline of interest is the application as it was first submitted, not the application as it appeared 
after some interaction with the relevant examiner. Even where I excluded a continuation 
application, however, I included the original application that led to that continuation, so long as 
the original application otherwise qualified. 
25 It is possible that some small number of these applications should have been excluded 
because, as late as one month before an application is published, the Patent Office allows an 
applicant to swap his original application for a more updated version. See 35 C.F.R. §1.215(c). 
Swapped applications are not distinguished from other applications when published; the only 
way to detect them is to consult the relevant file wrappers. They are problematic for this 
project because the baseline of interest is the application as it was first submitted, not the 
application as it appeared after some interaction with the relevant examiner. That said, 
unpublished Patent Office statistics suggest that fewer than 100 applicants take advantage of 
this regulation each year, which means that at most a negligible percentage of my applications 
were affected. See email from Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy Stephen 
Kunin (January 25, 2003) (on file with author). 
 LICHTMAN | RETHINKING PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL   9 
A.  Examiner Disparities 
To answer the question about examiner disparities, I needed to draw from each 
application/patent pair three basic types of information. The first type of 
information was simply the name of the examiner or examiners who actually 
reviewed each application in the data set. This was easy information to acquire, 
given that examiners are identified by name on the patents they allow. Indeed, the 
only judgment call that had to be made with respect to this information was a 
decision regarding how to code patents where two examiners—an inexperienced 
“assistant examiner” working under a more experienced “primary examiner”—
together reviewed the same application. I decided that the best approach was to 
treat each unique team as a separate entity, the logic being that, from the 
perspective of a patent applicant, an evaluation conducted by examiners Smith and 
Jones is meaningfully different from an evaluation conducted by examiners Smith 
and Williams, even though both pairs include examiner Smith. In the database, I 
therefore gave each unique team, and each individual examiner, a distinct 
identifier. 
The second type of information that I needed to extract was some measure of 
the extent to which a given application’s claim language changed during the 
course of patent prosecution. To that end, I decided to count (1) the number of 
unique words used in the issued claims but not used in the original claims; and (2) 
the number of unique words used in the original claims but not used in the issued 
claims. That is, I made a list of the vocabulary used to describe the invention in 
the application claims, and I made a list of the vocabulary used to describe the 
invention in the patent claims; I then compared the two lists, counting any word 
that was present on one list but missing from the other. The intuition is that every 
time an applicant either introduces a new vocabulary word or removes an existing 
vocabulary word, he assumes the risk that a court will later construe the change as 
a concession. The number of vocabulary changes is therefore a rough proxy for 
estoppel risk.26 
                                                   
26 Admittedly, there are limitations to this approach. For example, it accidentally counts 
typographical errors that are present in the application but corrected in the issued patent, even 
though those carry with them little estoppel risk. It also counts language changes in instances 
where the applicant has other claims that cover the same subject matter and, hence, there is a 
plausible argument that the changes should not be read to forfeit any ground. Moreover, this 
approach necessarily fails to detect any estoppel not associated with language changes, such as 
an estoppel that arises by virtue of an argument presented by the applicant during patent 
prosecution. These and related limitations are admittedly important; but their implications 
should not be overstated. After all, these factors affect every observation, and thus it is unlikely 
that they significantly distort comparisons between examiners and across technology 
categories. 
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The third type of information I needed to gather was information that might 
help to control for relevant differences between the applications. One obviously 
important control was some measure of application length. I ultimately decided to 
use for this purpose the number of different vocabulary words that were used in 
the original application claims. This is one measure of length, and it correlates 
strongly to other obvious measures like the number of words in the application 
claims, the number of words in the application overall, and the number of claims 
listed in the application. This count has an added virtue, however, in that it also 
provides information about the complexity of the original application. The 
intuition here is that applications with a high degree of vocabulary diversity are 
likely harder to evaluate than applications where the number of distinct vocabulary 
words is relatively low.27 
A second obviously important control was information regarding the type of 
technology described in each application. If an application claiming an advance in 
nanotechnology naturally invites more language alteration than an otherwise 
comparable application related to automobile bumpers—an outcome I confirm in 
                                                                                                                                      
That said, I have run a number of robustness checks to look for these sorts of problems. 
For example, in one run I coded not only the word counts referenced above, but also weighted 
versions where the introduction or removal of a rare word counted more heavily than the 
introduction or removal of a common one. I actually did this with considerable precision. I 
gathered a sample of 10,000 issued patents and created a frequency table that showed in how 
many of those patents any given word appeared. I then assigned scores based on the inverse of 
the frequencies, such that the loss or addition of a common word like “the” or “said” was 
scored close to zero, whereas the loss or addition of a rare word like “hand-activated” or 
“vacant” was scored close to one. I ended up dropping these weighted vocabulary counts from 
the analysis, however, because they turned out to be almost perfectly correlated with the 
simpler unweighted tallies. Other robustness checks—for example, a run that counted only 
those language changes that affected independent claims—similarly seemed to have little 
effect on the ultimate results. 
27 Another reason for using the number of vocabulary words rather than other intuitive 
measures is that the other measures are each significantly distorted by the pyramid structure of 
patent claiming. Patent claims are drafted such that broad “independent” claims stake out the 
main contributions and then largely redundant “dependent” claims repeat the theme of each 
broad claim but add additional narrowing information. Counting the number of claims 
therefore poorly measures the length of an application, because this number is significantly 
influenced by the number of dependent claims even though those are typically trivial to 
evaluate once their related independent claims have been studied. Counting the number of 
words used in the claims also poorly measures length, again because that number is unduly 
sensitive to the number of dependent claims. Counting the number of independent claims is a 
better option, but that tally ignores the fact that dependent claims do add new information that 
must be reviewed, albeit less than would an additional independent claim. Counting the 
number of distinct vocabulary words therefore seemed like the most reliable measure of 
application length, in that it is not sensitive to repetition and yet it does account for any new 
vocabulary introduced in dependent claims. 
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this study—comparing examiners without simultaneously accounting for 
technology introduces significant error into the analysis: an examiner who works 
more often on automobile bumpers would seem less exacting than his 
nanotechnology peer, no matter what the real differences between the two. The 
difficult question was how best to capture this information. After all, every 
successful application to some degree describes its own distinct technology, and 
yet it is impossible to conduct statistical analysis in a situation where every 
observation is treated as being part of a unique group.  
In the patent literature, approaches vary, with some papers introducing 
elaborate classification schemes that distinguish hundreds of technology 
categories, while others settle for relatively course alternatives that lump all 
technologies together under six or ten headings. Typically, the decision is driven 
by two factors: the size of the data set under consideration, and the perceived 
importance of technology characteristics to the research question at hand. I 
ultimately decided to err on the side of caution and adopt a fine-grained approach. 
Specifically, the Patent Office classifies issued patents according to a system that 
distinguishes 421 technology types, and every issued patent is labeled with a 
three-digit code that identifies the technology according to this classification 
scheme. I lifted those codes from the patents in the data set, chose the ten classes 
for which I had the most observations, and used those classes to study examiners 




438 Semiconductor Device Manufacturing Process
365 Static Information Storage and Retrieval
257 Active Solid-State Devices
439 Electrical Connectors
123 Internal-Combustion Engines
327 Misc Active Electrical Nonlinear Devices, Circuits & Systems
359 Optics: Systems and Elements
361 Electricity: Electircal Systems & Devices
347 Incremental Printing of Symbolic Information
701 Data Processing: Vehicles, Navigation, and Relative Location  
Figure 1  The ten patent classes studied in this research; descriptors are drawn 
 directly from the Patent Office classification chart. 
When I first designed this project, I suspected that, in addition to controlling 
for application length and technology, it would also be important to control for the 
size and expertise of the law firm, if any, that prosecuted each application. This 
might be important if, for example, the patent prosecution strategies adopted by 
large firms differ from those adopted by patent boutiques in ways that affect claim 
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language alteration. Law firms are typically identified by name on the patents they 
prosecute, so I recorded law firm names whenever they were available, and then 
matched those names to publicly available information about the number of 
patents each firm prosecuted in the last five years, the approximate number of 
licensed patent attorneys employed by each firm, and the average experience level 
of the patent attorneys employed by each firm.28 In the end, I was able to add this 
information to approximately two-thirds of the applications in the database; yet, to 
my surprise, the results did not turn out to have much explanatory power. While 
these variables were statistically significant in the context of an occasional patent 
class, even there the effect was always several orders of magnitude smaller than 
the effects attributed to the various examiner-specific variables. I therefore 
decided to simplify my regressions—and, through that, expand the number of 
statistical tools available for use with the data29—by dropping these controls. 
More broadly, when I designed this project, I identified a large number of 
additional controls that I imagined as possibly relevant, including some for which 
the necessary information was readily available and others where the necessary 
information would have been all but impossible to track down. For example, it 
likely matters whether the person who actually drafted the patent application was 
able to meet with the patent examiner in person, rather than interacting exclusively 
through telephone calls and the exchange of written documents. It likely also 
would be informative to know the number of prior art sources cited in each 
application, because a long list might signal that the applicant was particularly 
diligent in preparing the application, or that the application falls into a relatively 
crowded art. It might be helpful to know the country where the claimed 
technology was first developed or patented, because an application written 
originally for another country’s patent system might differ substantially from one 
originally drafted with Patent Office rules and regulations in mind. It might even 
be helpful to know if there was a company involved in guiding the application, as 
applications prosecuted on behalf of individual inventors surely differ from 
applications where a for-profit corporation is paying the fees and calling the shots. 
                                                   
28 I counted the number of patents prosecuted by each firm myself, and I acquired the 
information about the number of licensed attorneys and their experience from PatentRatings, 
LLC, which in turn was able to get the information from records maintained and made public 
by the Patent Office through its Office of Enrollment and Discipline. 
29 The median test, which turned out to be the most reliable statistical tool by which to 
confirm the existence of examiner-specific effects, is severely limited in the number of control 
variables it can accommodate. Restricting the number of control variables thus turned out to be 
an important objective in my data collection strategy. 
 LICHTMAN | RETHINKING PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL   13 
Rather than overwhelm the analysis with an unending list of considerations, 
however, I decided instead to restrict the study to include only those examiners for 
whom I had ten or more observations. The logic is that, within a given technology 
class, most other factors are randomly distributed across applications, such that, 
over the course of a large enough sample, every examiner working within a 
particular technology class will face approximately the same number of 
applications originally drafted for a foreign country, approximately the same 
number of applications where the applicant requests in-person negotiations, and so 
on. If true, these factors can be safely ignored, as they will not distort comparisons 
from one examiner to another.30 










701 10 202  
Figure 2  The data set, described by patent class, including only those 
 examiners with 10 or more observations.  
Figure 2 describes the resulting data. The first column identifies the relevant 
patent class, the second column reports the number of examiners working in that 
class who processed 10 or more applications during the timeframe of interest, and 
the third column counts the total number of applications processed by those 
                                                   
30 Of course, I would be even more comfortable with this assumption were I able to set the 
minimum threshold at twenty or thirty observations, rather than ten. However, two factors 
cautioned against such an adjustment. First, the higher the threshold, the more data excluded 
from the analysis. That is a serious cost in this study given that I started out with only 
approximately 20,000 patent applications representing nearly 400 patent classes and nearly 
3,000 patent examiners. Second, excluding examiners with small numbers of observations 
biases the data against a finding of examiner diversity. The reason is that a minimum threshold 
excludes examiners who work slowly and thus were not able to process the requisite number of 
applications during the timeframe under consideration, and it also excludes examiners who 
work quickly and thus processed more than the requisite number but did not have enough that 
lasted the eighteen months required to trigger mandatory publication. The higher the threshold, 
the greater these distortions. Thus, I was reluctant to choose too high a threshold, especially 
given that most of the missing controls are likely of trivial import as compared to the 
technology, length, and complexity factors that I explicitly account for in the regressions. 
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examiners. This is the data that I used to answer the question about examiner 
disparities. 
B.  Technology Disparities 
With the preceding information already gathered, no additional information 
was required to study differences across technologies. The only adjustment I made 
was to replace the 421-category technology classification system with a 36-
category alternative developed by the National Bureau of Economic Affairs.31 The 
rationale for the change is purely cosmetic: the 36-category approach uses 
classifications that might be more intuitive for the lay reader. The categories, and 









Computers/Comm Computer Hardware/Software 842
Computers/Comm Computr Peripherals 411
Computers/Comm Information Storage 787
Drugs/Medical Drugs 302
Drugs/Medical Surgey/Med Instruments 292
Drugs/Medical Biotechnology 112
Drugs/Medical Misc 101
Electrical/Electronic Electrical Devices 1,258
Electrical/Electronic Electrical Lighting 325
Electrical/Electronic Measuring/Testing 507
Electrical/Electronic Nuclear/X-rays 183
Electrical/Electronic Power Systems 1,163
Electrical/Electronic Semiconductor Devices 1,217
Electrical/Electronic Misc 354
Mechanical Materials Processing 471






Other Amusement Devices 119
Other Apparel/Textile 298
Other Earth Working/Wells 130




Other Misc 1,164  
Figure 3  The data set, described according to the NBER classification system. 
III.   ANALYSIS 
I report my statistical methods and findings in three parts. The first part 
articulates a simple regression model and uses it to test whether examiner identity 
                                                   
31 Available online at http://www.nber.org/patents. 
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influences patterns of claim language alteration. The second part uses that model 
to estimate the magnitude of any examiner-specific effects. Lastly, the third part 
introduces a comparable model that tests whether and to what degree technology 
affects these same language considerations. 
A. Examiners Matter 
Define an examiner’s editorial “STYLE” to be the examiner’s proclivity to alter 
patent vocabulary, expressed as a fraction where the numerator is the sum of the 
number of new vocabulary words introduced in the patent claims plus the number 
of existing vocabulary words omitted from the original application claims, while 
the denominator is the total number of vocabulary words used in the original 
application claims. Style is thus a percentage measure of vocabulary change, 
where a larger score implies more significant language alterations. 
My regression model can be specified as follows: 
STYLE Application = STYLE Examiner + υ 
where STYLEApplication is the editorial style reflected in the application/patent pair 
at issue, STYLEExaminer is the idiosyncratic editorial style of the relevant examiner, 
and υ stands in for error as well as unobserved inputs. Technology is not 
referenced in the equation because, as explained in the previous section, I control 
for technology in this part of the study by focusing on one patent class at a time. 
I used the median test to determine whether examiner identity influences the 
style variable.32 As those familiar with this sort of statistical work know, the 
median test is not a powerful test, which is to say that it often will fail to detect 
patterns even when they are in fact present. The test therefore is not useful for 
ruling out the possibility of a pattern, but it is particularly useful for establishing 
the existence of a pattern. The median test has another virtue as well: it makes no 
assumptions about the distribution of the data under consideration. ANOVA, by 
contrast, is widely used in the literature, but it is reliable only in instances where 
the groups being tested are all drawn from populations that have the same 
approximate variance. The Kruskal-Wallis test is another common choice, but it is 
inaccurate when applied to data where a large number of the observations take on 
the same value. 
                                                   
32 For background on the median test, see <citation>. 
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Figure 4 reports the results of the median test for each of the ten technology 
classes I consider. The numbers represent the confidence level for the hypothesis 
that grouping by examiner is not the same as grouping randomly. 
Patent Class Examiners Observations Median Test
438 11 157 0.197
365 17 451 0.000
257 11 140 0.025
439 12 250 0.006
123 16 334 0.000
327 15 244 0.000
359 12 187 0.013
361 8 144 0.541
347 10 173 0.008
701 10 202 0.013  
Figure 4   Median test results, reported by patent class. 
In summary, even with a relatively insensitive test, the data regarding 
language alterations suggest that examiner identity matters in five of the ten 
technology categories at a confidence level greater than 0.01, and in eight of the 
ten categories at a confidence level greater than 0.05. This is compelling evidence 
that there are examiner-specific effects.33 
B. Magnitude Estimates 
To estimate the magnitude of the various examiner effects is admittedly 
difficult using my data, both because there is a great deal of noise in the patent 
process, and because publication of patent applications is such a new program that 
at this stage I have a very limited number of observations per examiner. That said, 
I report here the point estimates derived from running tobit regressions for each of 
my ten technology classes. In each regression, the style of the relevant observation 
was the dependent variable and the independent variables were dummy variables 
standing in for the style of each examiner working in the relevant patent class. 
Tobit was the appropriate choice here because, in a somewhat surprising 20% of 
the observations, no changes were made to claim language during patent 
                                                   
33 This evidence is consistent with the results obtained by other researchers who have 
looked to see whether examiners vary along dimensions other than their tendency to alter claim 
language. See, e.g., Iain Cockburn, Sam Kortem & Scott Stern, Are All Patent Examiners 
Equal? The Impact of Characteristics on Patent Statistics and Litigation Outcomes, in Patents 
in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Cohen & Merrill, eds, 2003) at 19-53 (arguing, among 
other things, that some examiners are more likely than others to have their patents invalidated 
by the Federal Circuit). 
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prosecution and thus the data are bunched at zero.34 Again, the point estimates are 
significantly imprecise, yet they nevertheless communicate some information 
about the magnitude of each examiner effect, and, perhaps more important, they 
help to establish that magnitude differences across examiners are not trivial and 
might indeed be quite sizeable. 
Figure 5 reports the results in summary form. Specifically, for each 
technology class, I include the mean style for applications in that class; the 
difference between the examiner in the relevant sample who edits most and the 
examiner in the relevant sample who edits least, reported as a percentage of the 
mean; and the difference between the examiner who is at the 75th percentile and 
the examiner who is at the 25th percentile, again reported as a percentage of the 
mean.  
Patent Class Mean High - Low 75th - 25th
438 0.13 70% 34%
365 0.09 185% 70%
257 0.20 190% 50%
439 0.25 154% 35%
123 0.10 333% 159%
327 0.21 166% 60%
359 0.16 216% 66%
361 0.21 134% 16%
347 0.15 359% 100%
701 0.11 299% 76%  
Figure 5   Magnitudes of the various examiner effects. 
The results obviously reveal considerable differences between examiners. 
Even the conservative 75th-25th measure suggests that, on average, 66% of the 
style score is determined solely by the identity of the examiner involved.35 
                                                   
34 Tobit is the correct choice rather than probit because observations are censored at zero, 
not truncated there.   
35 One concern with this statistic is that there might be an informal norm at the Patent 
Office under which the least complicated applications are assigned to inexperienced examiners 
and the most complicated applications are reserved for their more experienced peers. This 
norm would be difficult to maintain. At first blush, it is not so easy to predict which 
applications will prove difficult and which straightforward. Moreover, even if such distinctions 
can be drawn, complicated applications have to be assigned to junior examiners in instances 
where all the relevant senior examiners are already swamped with work, and in instances 
where the junior examiner is the only examiner with the appropriate technical expertise. 
Nevertheless, if it is true that inexperienced examiners are assigned a disproportionate share of 
the straightforward applications, the statistic reported above would be misleading. The 
problem: if inexperienced examiners routinely evaluate straightforward patent applications, 
while experienced examiners routinely evaluate more complicated fare, differences between 
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C. Technology Matters 
To study whether technology influences the number of language alterations 
made to a given application, I repeated the above analysis but grouped 
applications by technology rather than examiner identity. More precisely, I used 
the median test to ask whether dividing the data by technology produced a pattern 
of results that was inconsistent with random grouping, and I ran tobit regressions 
using dummy variables that represented not the examiners, but the technology 
types. As mentioned earlier, for this part of the study and for purely cosmetic 
reasons, I report the results using the more intuitive 36 technology categories 
suggested by the National Bureau of Economic Research instead of the 421 
categories developed by the Patent Office. 
                                                                                                                                      
examiners might not be evidence of examiner-specific variation, but might instead simply 
reflect the fact that different examiners work on applications of different complexity.  
To address this worry, I repeated the median test and regressions reported thus far, but did 
so using a data set that excludes any examiners working in teams. As I pointed out before, 
inexperienced examiners do not work alone. Instead, for the first five or six years of 
employment, an examiner must consult a more senior colleague before marking a patent 
application as ready for allowance. By excluding issued patents signed by two examiners, I 
therefore excluded all inexperienced examiners from the study and removed any taint that 
might be due to seniority-based application allocation. The results: whereas the original data 
regarding language alterations suggested that examiner identity matters in five of the ten 
technology categories at a confidence level greater than 0.01, the data set that excludes 
inexperienced examiners suggests that examiner identity matters in six of the ten technology 
categories at a confidence level greater than 0.01. The point estimates were also comparable, 
with the average style discrepancy rising from the 66% figure reported above to 75% using 
data from only experienced examiners. 









Computers/Comm Computer Hardware/Software 0.248
Computers/Comm Computr Peripherals 0.222
Computers/Comm Information Storage 0.103
Drugs/Medical Drugs 0.465
Drugs/Medical Surgey/Med Instruments 0.167
Drugs/Medical Biotechnology 0.486
Drugs/Medical Misc 0.256
Electrical/Electronic Electrical Devices 0.188
Electrical/Electronic Electrical Lighting 0.120
Electrical/Electronic Measuring/Testing 0.202
Electrical/Electronic Nuclear/X-rays 0.108
Electrical/Electronic Power Systems 0.131
Electrical/Electronic Semiconductor Devices 0.190
Electrical/Electronic Misc 0.206
Mechanical Materials Processing 0.194






Other Amusement Devices 0.300
Other Apparel/Textile 0.212
Other Earth Working/Wells 0.224




Other Misc 0.184  
Figure 6   Point estimates by technology category. 
The median test confirms that technology matters at a confidence level 
exceeding 0.000. Figure 6 shows the associated point estimates. The difference 
between the most- and least-edited technologies is nearly double the average score 
for technologies taken as a whole, and the difference between the technologies at 
the 75th and 25th percentiles is approximately 30% of that average style score.36 
Note that these point estimates are much more reliable than the point estimates 
reported with respect to examiners, because this time each is derived using a large 
number of observations.  
IV. DISCUSSION 
The empirical evidence presented in the previous section documents two basic 
insights: that patent examiners differ sharply in terms of their tendency to instigate 
claim language alterations; and that patterns of claim language alteration also vary 
substantially from one technology to another. As outlined in the Introduction, 
these findings have important implications for the rule of prosecution history 
                                                   
36 The difference between the most- and least-edited technologies is 0.417, while the mean 
for the entire data set is 0.228. The difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles is 0.064. 
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estoppel. The finding with respect to patent examiners suggests that the risks 
associated with prosecution history estoppel are allocated in an arbitrary manner. 
The threat of estoppel grows with the number of claim language amendments, and 
the number of claim language amendments is in turn significantly influenced by 
the editorial tendencies of the examiner. Meanwhile, the finding with respect to 
technology suggests that, while prosecution history estoppel is framed as if it were 
a rule that applies uniformly across technology categories, it is in fact a rule with 
technology-specific implications.37 It creates minefields for patentees who work in 
industries where language changes are common, but it is all but irrelevant where 
language changes are relatively rare. In this section, I develop these concerns more 
fully and integrate them into a broader discussion of both prosecution history 
estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents. 
A. Examiner Disparities 
It is hardly surprising that patent examiners differ from one another in ways 
that affect the scope and value of the patents they issue. Patent examiners are 
human, after all, and thus like judges, jurors, voters, and English teachers, their 
personalities and capabilities inevitably affect the decisions they make while on 
the job. What is surprising is that the rule of prosecution history estoppel is 
implemented in a way guaranteed to exacerbate the problem. Bluntly, the 
evidentiary presumptions currently in place render estoppel, and hence patent 
scope, remarkably sensitive to the happenstance of examiner identity. This is an 
unanticipated cost associated with the modern estoppel rule; and my basic 
argument here is that this cost must be weighed against whatever benefits the 
rule—and specifically the evidentiary presumptions—otherwise make possible.  
Economic-minded readers might initially reject my analysis on the ground 
that,  so long as the patent system is calibrated such that it offers the optimal level 
of protection on average, and so long as patent applicants are in general risk-
neutral, examiner inconsistency is not a problem because it will not alter applicant 
behavior. That is, if an applicant has a fifty percent chance of being awarded a 
patent that is too broad, and a fifty percent chance of being awarded a patent that 
is equally too narrow, basic economics seems to suggest that an applicant will 
invest in patent-eligible research at the exact level he would under a system where 
every patent came out just right. Consistency, on this argument, is irrelevant to 
patent system design, and thus the economic-minded reader might be tempted to 
                                                   
37 This supports Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley in their recent argument that the 
patent system has many such uneven doctrines. See Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers 
in Patent Law, Virginia L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003). 
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say that I am wrong to worry about examiner inconsistency in the context of 
prosecution history estoppel.38 
One obvious response is that many patent applicants are risk averse. 
Technology startups, for instance, are surely constrained by the practical and 
financial concerns associated with unpredictable patent rights and, indeed, 
unpredictable potential patent liabilities. Moreover, the United States patent 
system is explicitly designed with the small inventor in mind. The wisdom of this 
emphasis is subject to challenge, but the descriptive reality is that many patent 
doctrines unique to the American system—most notably, the rules that award 
patent protection to the first inventor to conceive of an invention, rather than the 
first inventor to file for patent protection39—are designed to favor small inventors. 
In the United States patent system, then, small inventors play a substantial role, 
and risk aversion has a seat at the policy table.40 
Putting risk aversion to one side, there are many other reasons why the 
intuitive argument fails and consistency is in fact an important objective in patent 
system design. First, even if the possibility of an overly broad patent perfectly 
offsets the possibility of an overly narrow patent from the perspective of a would-
be patentee, it does not necessarily follow that the social costs also offset. Quite 
the opposite, the social costs associated with overly broad patents likely 
overwhelm the social benefits associated with unduly narrow ones. The details 
depend on exactly what it means for a patent to be broad versus narrow; but the 
intuition follows from the familiar principle that, at prices near the monopolistic 
level, a marginal increase in price imposes more social harm than it yields in 
patentee benefit,41 whereas, at lower prices, the ratio of patentee benefit to social 
harm is typically more favorable and can even be reversed. Phrased another way, 
under a variety of conditions, the increase in deadweight loss associated with 
                                                   
38 The discussion above brackets distributional issues as well as incentives to engage in 
add-on research. Both of those are obviously very sensitive to patent scope and, hence, both 
support my argument that examiner consistency does matter from a public policy perspective. 
For a richer introduction to the economics of add-on innovation, see Robert Merges & Richard 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839 (1990); Douglas 
Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. Legal Stud. 615 (2000). 
39 See 35 U.S.C. §§102(g) & 135. 
40 Of course, research is itself significantly uncertain, and thus risk-averse patent 
applicants have other reasons to avoid the patent system beyond the legal uncertainty 
considered here. See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in Expanding the Boundaries of 
Intellectual Property (R. C. Dreyfuss, D. L. Zimmerman & H. First, eds. 2001). 
41 For discussion and a formal model, see Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting 
Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 985 
(1999). 
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raising a patent holder’s profits by $10 is larger than the reduction in deadweight 
loss associated with decreasing that patent holder’s return by the same $10. 
Because of that, variance that leaves patent applicants indifferent might 
nevertheless be unattractive from a social welfare perspective.42 
Along a similar theme, while it is easy to hypothesize a system where variance 
is increased but patent applicants on expectation earn the optimal reward, in 
practice such a system is almost impossible to design. The reason is edge 
conditions. An applicant who under the optimal system would have been denied 
patent protection will, under a high variance system, sometimes be awarded 
protection. But there is no offset against which to cancel that distorted incentive, 
because there is no such thing as negative patent protection. The same problem in 
the reverse might be true for applicants who, under the optimum system, would 
have received the broadest possible patent related to their invention. Here, there is 
again no offset against which to cancel out an errant patent, this time because by 
definition there can be no patent broader than the patent to which this applicant 
was already entitled. As a practical matter, then, a system with variance cannot 
perfectly mirror the outcomes achieved by a more consistent regime, and the result 
is increased investment in inventions that would be excluded from protection 
under ideal circumstances and decreased investment in inventions that would be 
prized most heavily under the optimal regime. 
I have focused thus far on difficulties inherent in the assumption of symmetric 
error, but another concern is that applicants will alter their behavior in socially 
undesirable ways even if examiner idiosyncrasies do cancel out. For instance, 
applicants are more likely to delay discretionary investments associated with their 
inventions in a system with high variance than they are in a more consistent 
alternative. The reason is that, in a regime with high variance, delay yields 
information that might in turn help the applicant to better prioritize different 
                                                   
42 Consider a specific example. Define demand to be linear demand of the form p=-q+1, 
where p is price and q is quantity. Suppose that marginal cost is zero and that the optimal 
patent would give the patent holder sufficient market power such that his price would be 0.3 
and thus his producer surplus would be 0.21. If an overbroad patent lets the patent holder 
charge 0.45 and thus earn a producer surplus that is 0.0375 greater, the corresponding overly 
narrow patent would allow the patent holder to charge 0.2216 and thereby earn 0.0375 less. By 
design, then, the patent holder would be indifferent between a patent regime that consistently 
allowed him to charge 0.4, and a patent regime that half the time allowed him to charge 0.45 
and half the time allowed him to charge 0.2216. But society is not indifferent. The latter 
approach leads to an expected deadweight loss that is 40% greater than the deadweight loss 
associated with the optimal patent. The numbers: at a price of 0.2216, the producer earns 
0.1725 and imposes deadweight loss of 0.0246; at a price of 0.3, the producer earns 0.21 and 
imposes a loss of 0.045; and at a price of 0.45, the producer earns 0.2475 and imposes a loss of 
0.10125. 
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possible investments. Concretely, an applicant who is unsure whether his claim 
will cover all touch-sensitive computer screens or merely touch-sensitive 
computer screens built using a particular design cannot know how best to allocate 
his marketing and manufacturing resources. Such an applicant will have an 
incentive to hold those resources in reserve until uncertainty is reduced, in that 
way increasing the odds that any additional investments will maximize the value 
of the patent as it ultimately issues. 
Another undesirable behavior change is that applicants who would have 
chosen to pursue patent protection under a consistent patent regime might, in light 
of examiner variance, opt instead to rely on trade secrecy. Trade secrecy is a 
competitor to the patent system,43 and the ideal patent system would be tailored to 
ensure that appropriate inventions are directed toward the appropriate system. 
Examiner variance distorts the optimal allocation by changing the patent system’s 
risk/reward profile. The patent system thus must either lure marginal inventions 
back by compensating in some other way—presumably at the cost of some other 
social interest—or accept the fact that increased variance distorts the allocation of 
inventions between these two regimes. Note that there is an even more troubling 
possibility lurking here: it is possible that applicants can enter the patent system, 
begin to interact with their assigned examiner, and then retreat to trade secrecy in 
those instances where the examiner appears stingy. This cherry-picking would 
undermine any argument that examiner inconsistencies cancel out, as generous 
examiners would end up issuing many more patents than would their more finicky 
peers.44 
The list of problems potentially raised by examiner disparities can go on at 
some length. Inconsistency might undermine confidence in the patent system as 
both policymakers and the public realize that patent scope turns significantly on 
the luck of examiner assignment. It might undermine the statutory presumption of 
                                                   
43 See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property 
Law 381-433 (2003) (emphasizing that patent law is in many ways a response to the economic 
problems associated with trade secret protection). 
44 On a related theme, I should point out that, in some arts, there are so few examiners 
qualified to evaluate patent applications that the examiner’s identity is predictable. In those 
instances, prosecution history estoppel does not increase uncertainty, but it does affect 
applicant behavior in unintended ways. For instance, if the examiner most likely to evaluate 
patents relating to a particular photographic process is known to require significant claim 
language alterations, applicants might shy away from patenting inventions in that category, 
preferring instead to rely on trade secrecy. In most instances, however, it is difficult to predict 
the identity of the examiner, both because there are a large number of examiners employed at 
the Patent Office, and because there is substantial employee turnover as examiners move on to 
other careers in law, business, and government. 
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patent validity,45 this time because courts might become less willing to defer to 
what they perceive as, at best, a noisy information stream. It might also lead to 
increased litigation, if (say) overly broad patents are more likely to be challenged 
than are patents of appropriate scope. Any number of these many reasons combine 
to suggest that examiner consistency is a problem not only for patent applicants, 
but also for the patent system more generally. 
The discussion above disregards the fact that, in the context of prosecution 
history estoppel especially, applicants can mitigate the consequences of variance 
by investing additional resources in patent prosecution. For example, an applicant 
can appeal adverse examiner decisions up the Patent Office hierarchy, and an 
applicant can in certain instances turn for relief to the federal courts.46 There even 
exist procedures through which an applicant can ask the Patent Office to reopen an 
issued patent and reconsider the language of its claims.47 Further, as a last resort, 
applicants can always at a minimum carefully document the reasons for any 
language changes, in that way rebutting the various evidentiary presumptions that 
give estoppel its principal bite. From the applicant’s perspective, none of this 
changes the basic point, however: whether it is because the costs of patent 
prosecution go up, or because the risk of estoppel becomes more severe, it is still 
true that, the more finicky the examiner, the lower the returns to the patent holder. 
From a policy perspective, the analysis also remains largely unchanged even 
as these various applicant responses are considered. For instance, in the discussion 
above, I point out that, even where the possibility of an overly broad patent 
perfectly offsets the possibility of an overly narrow patent from the perspective of 
a would-be patentee, it does not necessarily follow that the social costs also offset. 
The reason is that the increase in deadweight loss associated with overly broad 
patents is likely greater than the decrease in deadweight loss associated with 
unduly narrow ones. This same basic logic holds if, instead of receiving unduly 
narrow patents, unlucky applicants spend more money on patent prosecution but 
then end up with patents of appropriate scope. After all, under this assumption, the 
patent system must still generate some number of overly broad patents to 
                                                   
45 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (obligating courts to presume that issued patents are valid). 
46 For an introduction to the various options, see Robert Merges & John Duffy, PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1153-1254 (2002). Even with these various 
possibilities, note that examiners do retain considerable discretion, as this oversight is only so 
fine-grained, and only certain decisions can be appealed anyway. See Thomas, supra note _, at 
204-06. 
47 Although the options here are limited. See Marty Adelman & Gary Francione, The 
Doctrine of Equivalence in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U Penn 
L Rev 673, 716 (1989). 
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compensate for the risk of expensive prosecution; and this time there is no 
possibility of an offsetting social gain, both because no unduly narrow patents 
issue, and because the extra money invested by unlucky applicants is itself 
deadweight loss—which is to say that these resources could be conserved if only 
examiners were more consistent. 
Take stock of what all this means. Because examiners differ considerably in 
terms of their tendency to require amendments to patent claim language, and 
because every amendment to patent claim language carries with it some risk of 
ultimately triggering prosecution history estoppel, the happenstance of examiner 
assignment has serious implications for patent scope. Draw a finicky examiner, 
and not only might that examiner directly press for literal claims that narrowly 
describe the invention at hand, but, by virtue of estoppel, that examiner might also 
indirectly constrain the protection that otherwise would be available under the 
doctrine of equivalents. This is obviously troubling to the unlucky patent applicant 
who is assigned a finicky examiner. My point in this section is that it is troubling 
from a public policy perspective as well. The reason: applicants will adjust their 
behavior in light of this random effect, in many instances choosing patterns of 
investment, disclosure and prosecution that reduce social welfare as compared to 
the patterns that would obtain were estoppel not an issue. 
B. Technology Disparities 
There are many plausible reasons why patterns of claim language alteration 
might vary from one technology to another. It might be, for example, that patents 
are used in different ways in different industries, and that those differences cause 
applicants in some fields to edit patent language more aggressively. It might be 
that more money is spent by applicants in certain industries than is spent by 
applicants in other industries, a difference that again would likely be reflected in 
the prosecution strategies played by the respective applicants. It might even be 
that a broad claim is worth more in certain industries, a difference that might make 
the relevant applicants more willing to file overly broad claims even if overly 
broad claims increase the risk of narrowing amendments and hence estoppel. If 
part of the explanation, however, is that language adjustments are more common 
in complicated and/or rapidly evolving technologies—technologies where it is 
more difficult for applicants to write appropriate claims in the first instance, and 
technologies where, at the time of patent prosecution, there is more room for 
reasonable disagreement between applicant and examiner—then the implication is 
that estoppel threatens to repeal the doctrine of equivalents in the very cases where 
that doctrine is needed most. 
To see this, consider the primary policy rationales that support the use of 
equivalents analysis. The first, and the one that courts most often stress, is the idea 
 LICHTMAN | RETHINKING PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL   26 
that patent holders should in certain situations be protected from “unscrupulous 
copyists” who would otherwise undermine the value of patent protection by 
exploiting literal loopholes in patent claim language.48 The classic articulation 
comes from the Supreme Court in Graver Tank, where the majority opined that 
the “essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice fraud on a patent” by 
making “unimportant and insubstantial changes” that, “though adding nothing, 
would be enough to take the copied matter outside” the scope of the literal 
claims.49 Many factors determine when this rationale applies—the Court vaguely 
states in Graver Tank that “equivalency must be determined against the context of 
the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case” and is not “a 
prisoner of  a formula”50—but a review of the cases suggests that three factors 
dominate: (1) a finding of infringement by equivalents is more attractive in 
instances where loopholes of the type under consideration would otherwise 
substantially reduce patent value in the long run; (2) a finding of infringement by 
equivalents is more attractive the more costly it would be for applicants to 
anticipate and avoid such loopholes in the future; and (3) a finding of equivalents 
is less attractive the less competitors had adequate notice that the patent would be 
interpreted to cover the equivalent at issue.51  
These factors interact in complicated ways. For instance, a variation that, at 
the time of prosecution, would have been obvious to a person “skilled in the art” 
might seem inappropriate for protection by equivalents on the ground that 
applicants should be expected to anticipate obvious variations. However, courts 
are rightly sympathetic,52 the implicit logic being that in such a case there is no 
notice problem because competitors can easily predict that trivial variations will 
fall within the scope of equivalents; moreover, applicants would in fact find it 
expensive to anticipate and describe every petty substitution that might be made 
by a strategic competitor, and the threat posed by these loopholes would indeed 
                                                   
48 Graver Tank, cite in note _, at 607. 
49 Id. at 607-08. 
50 Id. at 609. 
51 As this footnote itself makes clear, eevn a calim wtih literal ipemrfetcoins can siltl be 
reltaively esay to inertpret correctly. 
52 See, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 213 Ct. Cl. 395, 420 (1977) 
(“equivalency is established where a person reasonably skilled in the art would have known of 
the interchangeability of an ingredient not disclosed in the patent with one that was”). But see 
Adelman & Francione, supra note _, at 697 (criticizing these cases on ground that patentee 
should have chosen better claim language). 
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significantly erode patent value.53 A helpful way to think about such a case is to 
recognize that the doctrine of equivalents here serves to call off a wasteful arms 
race, a race that would otherwise encourage copyists to spend excessively on 
meaningless attempts to skirt literal claim language, and applicants to respond by 
upping the ante with respect to their attempts to craft the perfect phrase. 
Viewed in light of this policy rationale, the technology-specific implications 
of prosecution history estoppel cut precisely backwards. Estoppel restricts 
equivalents most severely in cases where claim language changed significantly 
during the course of patent prosecution. But the factors that likely explain the high 
number of language changes—the difficulty the applicant faced in crafting 
appropriate claim language up front, and the room that was left for reasonable 
disagreements between applicant and examiner—suggest that these are also 
instances where drafting comprehensive literal claim language would have been 
prohibitively expensive and instances where, even after prosecution, literal 
loopholes might still pervade. This is not to say that the doctrine of equivalents 
should always protect claims that fall in these categories. But if prosecution 
history estoppel means that the doctrine of equivalents cannot close loopholes in 
these cases, one has to wonder why patent law has a doctrine that allows for 
loophole-closing at all. 
The second major policy rationale that supports the use of equivalents analysis 
derives from the fact that, in certain situations, there is much to be gained from 
allowing a court to revisit patent scope even after a patent examiner has signed off 
on the patent’s claim language. The intuition is that patent prosecution takes place 
early in the development of a technology, long before relevant information is 
available about how the invention will mature and what its economic implications 
will be. In most cases, the patent system disregards this problem, reasoning that 
the applicant himself should know the invention well enough to craft appropriate 
literal claims. But, as applied to the most complicated and rapidly changing 
technologies, early claim drafting can be a recipe for disaster, and thus the 
doctrine of equivalents holds out the possibility that, in rare but appropriate 
circumstances, courts will in essence redraw claim boundaries using information 
that was not available at the time of patent prosecution.54 Doing so has a sizeable 
drawback—the practice denies competitors clear notice of what is, and what is 
                                                   
53 Encouraging exhaustive claiming would also be counterproductive, as the resulting 
claim language would either contain so much detail, or be written in such generic terms, that it 
would be almost impossible to read. 
54 The doctrine of equivalents allows the court to expand patent scope. The court in 
addition has the power to reduce patent scope either by invalidating a claim in full, or by 
narrowing its scope under the seldom-used reverse doctrine of equivalents. 
 LICHTMAN | RETHINKING PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL   28 
not, within the patent’s scope—but as applied to technologies where the claims 
issued at the end of patent prosecution would otherwise regularly prove 
inadequate, this sort of judicial intervention is a necessary evil. 
Unfortunately, as it was with the loophole rationale, here again the 
technology-specific implications of prosecution history estoppel work in reverse: 
nearly every case where judicial intervention might plausibly be attractive is also a 
case where equivalents analysis will be disproportionately limited by estoppel. 
After all, the same lack of information that would make intervention attractive will 
also make it more expensive for applicants to draft literal claim language up front, 
and also increase the likelihood that the examiner will disagree about the 
appropriate literal language and thus require that the applicant make changes 
during patent prosecution. Phrased another way, the same lack of information that 
would make intervention attractive during litigation also will lead to the behaviors 
during patent prosecution that trigger prosecution history estoppel. Far from 
reducing the uncertainty inherent in equivalents analysis—the justification 
invoked by the Supreme Court in Festo, Graver Tank, and Warner-Jenkinson—
the rule of prosecution history estoppel thus threatens to emasculate the doctrine. 
Finally, the third policy rationale supporting the existence of the doctrine of 
equivalents is based on the somewhat related idea of self-selection. Few patents 
end up being of real economic consequence, and thus in many cases the resources 
invested in patent review are pure waste.55 This is one reason why the process of 
patent prosecution is so minimalist. It might seem odd that patent prosecution 
involves only the applicant and an assigned examiner, and that the average 
prosecution consumes a mere eighteen hours of the examiner’s time;56 but the 
justification is that it makes no sense to instigate a grand production every time an 
inventor sees fit to file for patent protection, given that most patents spend their 
term gathering dust in a drawer.57 Patents that are drawn into litigation, however, 
                                                   
55 It is not always true that, where a patent ends up having no economic value, the 
resources invested in patent review were pure waste. For example, the process of patent 
prosecution might serve to reduce uncertainty by clarifying that a given patent has only narrow 
scope. The process might similarly sharpen claim language in a way that helps competitors 
successfully design around the patent. My point here is only that the resources devoted to 
patent evaluation can sometimes be used more efficiently if they are held in reserve until more 
is known about which patents have economic significance. 
56 Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1496 
n.3 (eighteen hours is the average total amount of “time spent reading the application, reading 
the submitted prior art, searching for and reading” additional prior art, and otherwise 
interacting with the applicant). 
57 Lemley develops this argument at length in the article cited in note _. His argument 
might understate the importance of removing uncertainty by declaring dud patents invalid 
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are a special subset. They have economic consequence—why else would the 
parties find it worthwhile to invest in litigation?—and it is therefore more likely 
worthwhile to invest in them the resources needed for vigorous review. This is 
why litigation allows parties opposed to the patent to themselves participate in the 
process; and this is why, instead of working with the relatively thin factual record 
typically cobbled together for patent prosecution, in litigation courts encourage the 
parties to document with care evidence regarding exactly when the patentee took 
each inventive step and exactly what was at each moment already known to the 
prior art. 
Applications that are particularly attractive for this more intensive “second 
look” are applications where there is reason to doubt the quality of the work done 
during patent prosecution. My argument, at this point predictable, is that many 
such applications will also be applications where court discretion is sharply 
limited by prosecution history estoppel. The reason, as before, is that the factors 
that likely lead applicants to file claim language that is then altered during patent 
prosecution are some of the very factors that also suggest a need for the more 
vigorous review available through litigation. These are applications covering 
particularly complicated inventions, and applications related to rapidly developing 
technology categories, two categories where it is understandably difficult for 
applicants to predict what their assigned examiner will approve, and two 
categories where it is also obviously true that the extra firepower available in 
litigation would lead to more appropriate patent scope. Thus, here again, estoppel 
threatens to limit equivalents analysis in the core cases that equivalents analysis 
was designed to address. To accept a legal rule that makes equivalents 
disproportionately unavailable in these cases is therefore in a very real sense to 
abandon the doctrine of equivalents.58  
C.  Reforms and Responses 
Concerns about differences between examiners and across technology 
categories can be addressed. For example, the evidentiary presumptions that under 
current law significantly amplify the risk of estoppel could be reversed, such that 
                                                                                                                                      
rather than allowing them to issue, but his basic point is surely right: the limited resources 
spent on patent review must be allocated wisely between patent prosecution on the one hand, 
and patent litigation on the other. 
58 Even if I am wrong in all of the arguments put forward in this section—that is, if I am 
incorrect in my explanation for why patterns of language alteration differ from one technology 
to the next, or if a reader disagrees with my interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents—note 
that my basic point nevertheless survives: estoppel is a rule with technology-specific 
implications, and those implications have been ignored in the design and implementation of the 
modern evidentiary presumptions. 
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estoppel is triggered only when there is clear evidence that the applicant explicitly 
waived his right to later argue that a particular product or process is an equivalent. 
Similarly, while it might be expensive to do, patent examiners could be required to 
document more carefully the reasons for any claim language changes, again the 
purpose being to ensure that estoppel is triggered only in those rare instances 
where an applicant was indeed aware of and intending to disclaim specific 
coverage. These and comparable reforms would reduce the legal risk associated 
with amendments to claim language, and they would thereby reduce the 
importance of examiner and technology disparities.59 
Admittedly, this would at the same time render prosecution history estoppel 
less effective at the goal of bringing certainty to equivalents analysis. After all, the 
fewer times estoppel is triggered, the fewer safe harbors it creates, and thus the 
wider the scope of equivalents left intact. But that just confirms that estoppel is a 
mechanism poorly suited to the task of increasing certainty. Implemented 
conservatively, it will be triggered only rarely. Implemented moderately, it likely 
increases overall uncertainty by forcing patentees and their rivals to predict not 
only how a court will apply the doctrine of equivalents to the claims at hand, but 
also whether estoppel was triggered and how broad the resulting limitations will 
be. Implemented as it is today, with strong evidentiary presumptions papering 
over holes in the record, the rule is dangerously sensitive to differences between 
examiners and across technologies. Patent law could better improve certainty by 
arbitrarily suspending the doctrine of equivalents for any patent assigned a patent 
number that is evenly divisible by seven. From the perspective of patent 
applicants, such a rule would be equally random; and at least the divisible-by-
seven rule would not disproportionately target those technologies where 
equivalents analysis is needed most. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I have focused in this Article on the specific theory that prosecution history 
estoppel can be an effective mechanism by which to cabin the uncertainty created 
by the doctrine of equivalents. That theory was not targeted at random. It is the 
theory that the Supreme Court invoked in every case where the Court then 
articulated and defended the evidentiary presumptions at issue here; and it is the 
theory that pervades the several opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in the 
context of the recent and on-going Festo litigation. That said, increased 
                                                   
59 Examiner differences could also be tackled head-on, perhaps by involving an additional 
examiner in each prosecution or by making appeals within the Patent Office more routine. The 
large number of patent applications filed each year, however, would likely render these reforms 
prohibitively expensive. 
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predictability is not the only plausible theory that justifies the rule of prosecution 
history estoppel, and the arguments I have presented here have implications for 
those alternative theories as well. 
For example, it might be that the act of negotiating claim language with an 
examiner puts an applicant in a better position to write clear, appropriately tailored 
literal claims. If so, then some form of estoppel might be an appropriate response, 
in essence increasing the importance of literal claim language in cases where that 
language can bear the extra burden. Likewise, it might be that examiners who 
aggressively influence claim language are also the most conscientious about their 
work. If so, again estoppel would have policy allure, this time because it would 
obligate courts to defer more heavily to conscientious examiners. It might even be 
that the real motivation behind prosecution history estoppel is to encourage 
applicants to submit appropriately narrow claims right from the start.60 The logic 
this time is that unduly broad claims are particularly likely to be changed during 
patent prosecution, and thus estoppel threatens most severely those applicants who 
claim too much in their original patent applications.61 
These theories have strengths and weaknesses. My contribution is simply to 
emphasize that, no matter what the underlying policy motivation, an estoppel 
doctrine implemented with stringent evidentiary presumptions threatens two 
unintended consequences: it disproportionately limits the doctrine of equivalents 
in particular technology classes, and it makes patent value more random by 
linking patent scope to a personal characteristic that varies considerably from one 
examiner to another. With respect to the uncertainty rationale, these costs are in 
my view devastating. As applied to other rationales, these costs are factors that 
must be weighed both when comparing estoppel to competing mechanisms, and 
when deciding the appropriate weight and direction of any evidentiary 
presumptions. 
                                                   
60 See Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of 
Festo, 151 U. Penn. L. Rev. 159 (2002) (developing this theory). See also John Duffy, The 
Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
273, at 319-20 (emphasizing that it has long been standard practice for applicants to submit 
unduly broad claims at first and then gradually whittle those claims down during patent 
prosecution). 
61 There are many other plausible explanations for prosecution history estoppel. For 
example, estoppel might defend the integrity of Patent Office review by ensuring that an 
applicant cannot take one position while trying to convince an examiner to allow a claim, and 
then adopt a conflicting position during later litigation. Estoppel also pressures applicants to 
exhaust available Patent Office remedies, although query whether that is a benefit or a cost. 
For discussion of these and other theories, see Thomas, cited in note _, at 204-09. 
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In short, and again no matter what the underlying theory, the rule of 
prosecution history estoppel must be crafted in a way that is sensitive to the 
practical realities of patent prosecution. The Supreme Court said as much in 
Festo;62 yet the Court went on in that case to endorse an interpretation that fails 
the test. The Federal Circuit will have the opportunity to mitigate this problem as 
it develops the details of the evidentiary presumptions established in Warner-
Jenkinson and Festo, and as it decides in the first instance the proper presumptions 
to be used at other steps in estoppel analysis.63 My purpose in this Article is to 
provide the Federal Circuit with the arguments and empirical evidence it needs to 
engage in that process.  
                                                   
62 Festo VIII, cited in note _, at 738. 
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